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THE PROBLEM OF HAVING ONLY ONE CITY: 
AN AUGUSTINIAN RESPONSE TO RAWLS 
Peter C. Meilaender 
John Rawls, in his book Political Liberalism, mentions Augustine 
only in a throwaway remark including him among those who 
would oppose political liberalism. In fact, however, there are sur-
prising similarities between Rawls's book and the kind of politics 
suggested by The City of God. Augustine and Rawls confront a 
similar problem: How can one achieve stability and unity in the 
face of ineliminable pluralism? And they respond in similar fash-
ion: by rejecting appeals to a comprehensive understanding of 
"justice" or the "whole truth," which inevitably divide citizens, 
and instead seeking a basis for political unity in those things 
which all citizens hold in common-an overlapping consensus on 
a political conception of justice (Rawls), or shared loves 
(Augustine). Despite his stated intentions, however, Rawls 
reveals hidden hopes for a politics loftier than one might expect; 
and, through the device of public reason, he seeks to ensure that 
such a politics is realized. Augustine, on the other hand, though 
he too may harbor such hopes, does not insist upon a nobler poli-
tics, and in the end it is his thought which provides the firmer 
foundation for political liberalism. 
The index to John Rawls's Political Liberalism lists only one reference to 
St. Augustine. It appears in chapter three, on the idea of an overlapping 
consensus, in a section entitled, "How Is Political Liberalism Possible?" In 
the first paragraph of this section, Rawls distinguishes between two funda-
mentally different approaches to politics: "One of the deepest distinctions 
between conceptions of justice is between those that allow for a plurality of 
reasonable though opposing comprehensive doctrines each with its own 
conception of the good, and those that hold that there is but one such con-
ception to be recognized by all citizens who are fully reasonable and ratio-
nal."l Political liberalism is of the first sort, those that allow for a plurality 
of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Rawls then mentions some 
thinkers holding the opposite view: "Plato and Aristotle, and the Christian 
tradition as represented by Augustine and Aquinas, fall on the side of the 
one reasonable and rational good" (134). Presumably we are to conclude 
from this that Rawls would number Augustine among the opponents of 
political liberalism. 
This may seem like a fairly safe assumption. After all, what could the 
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Christian saint and father of the church have in common with the foremost 
contemporary defender of a neutral liberalism that deliberately abstracts 
from comprehensive world-views like Augustine's? The question's sim-
plicity, however, is deceptive, for Augustine's views may not be as hostile 
to political liberalism as Rawls's remark suggests. Scholars such as Herbert 
Deane, Jean Bethke Elshtain, and Robert Markus have all argued, in differ-
ent ways, that Augustine's political thought has important affinities with 
liberalism.2 Indeed, Edmund Santurri has recently argued specifically that 
Augustinians ought to embrace the Rawlsian program laid out in Political 
Liberalism.3 My conclusions are more cautious than Santurri's, but I do 
wish to argue here that the structural similarities between the argument of 
Political Liberalism and an Augustinian understanding of politics, implicit in 
The City of God, are extremely striking-whether Rawls himself is aware of 
it or not. Though Rawls's offhand comment may discourage the attempt, 
both Rawlsians and Christians alike have an interest in exploring these 
possibilities for common ground, as the first two sections of this paper 
attempt to do. 
This might well be sufficient justification for a careful comparison of the 
odd couple of Rawls and Augustine. In the final section of the paper, 
though, I shall move beyond mere comparison to suggest that Augustine's 
thought actually provides a foundation for political liberalism superior to 
Rawls's. At points in Rawls's account, I believe, especially in his introduc-
tion of the concept of public reason, we can discern a vague dissatisfaction 
with his own argument. Reflection upon the source of this dissatisfaction 
reveals that Rawls is ultimately right to sense a difference between 
Augustine's approach and his own. That difference is not a weakness of 
Augustine's, however, but a strength. 
1. Surprising Similarities? 
I wish to emphasize an underlying structural similarity between the 
approach to politics in Political Liberalism and that in The City of God. Thus I 
do not intend to argue, for instance, that Augustinians and Rawlsians need 
agree on specific principles, such as Rawls's famous two principles of jus-
tice, or that they will always endorse the same kinds of policies. Rather, I 
want to suggest that the two books present a similar conception of what 
politics is. In particular, I shall argue that, though they describe these phe-
nomena in different language, both imagine political life as a response to a 
certain kind of problem, reject one possible solution to that problem, and 
ultimately endorse the same alternative solution to it. 
First, Rawls and Augustine both confront a similar problem at the basis 
of political life: a condition of permanent pluralism. Rawls understands 
this pluralism as a result of the liberty protected by modem liberal democ-
racies. Free enquiry inevitably results in a plurality of reasonable "compre-
hensive doctrines," or ways of understanding life as a whole. As long as 
free enquiry is permitted, this situation will continue. "rA] plurality of rea-
sonable yet incompatible comprehensive doctrines," as Rawls puts it, "is 
the normal result of the exercise of human reason within the framework of 
the free institutions of a constitutional democratic regime" (xvi). Stability 
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thus becomes a crucial problem for the political philosopher. If people dis-
agree fundamentally about things as important as justice and the good life, 
how can they resolve their political disputes in a mutually satisfactory way 
and live together in harmony? Just as those who experienced the religious 
wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries finally developed a princi-
ple of religious toleration, Rawls suggests, we must develop a principle of 
toleration for clashing metaphysical doctrines of all kinds (pp. xxi-xxix). 
Rawls states repeatedly that this question of stability is the central problem 
he seeks to solve. As he puts it at the beginning of his first chapter: "[H]ow 
is it possible for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free and 
equal citizens, who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, 
philosophical, and moral doctrines" (4)? 
Augustine also faces the problem of ineliminable "pluralism," which is 
central to The City of God. All humanity, according to Augustine, is divided 
into two cities, the civitas Dei and the civitas terrena, whose members will 
ultimately be sorted out at the end of time. Until then, though, they live 
among each other. "In truth, those two cities are interwoven and inter-
mixed in this era, and await separation at the last judgement."4 Nor is the 
pluralism confronting Augustine simply metaphorical. Augustine is every 
bit as familiar as Rawls with philosophical pluralism and disagreement. 
Indeed, he opens Book XIX of the City of God by recounting the various 
philosophical sects--288 in all!-that had been analyzed by Varro. (He 
does point out that these are "possible" sects, not necessarily ones "already 
in existence" [844], but clearly Varro's account did not arise from a setting 
of philosophical homogeneity.)5 Among the philosophical disagreements 
noted by Varro are ones crucial to social and political life, such as whether 
virtue is pursued for its own sake or for the sake of other goods, whether 
the good is desired merely for one's self or also in fellowship with others, 
and whether or not one should engage in politics. Even this extraordinary 
philosophical diversity pales in comparison to the stark and fundamental 
divide Augustine discerns between Christians and non-believers: "all these 
philosophers have wished, with amazing folly, to be happy here on earth 
and to achieve bliss by their own efforts" (852), whereas the City of God 
holds that "eternal life is the Supreme Good, and eternal death the 
Supreme Evil" (852). Like the philosophical pluralism described by Varro, 
this theological "pluralism" of the two cities also creates concrete social 
divisions that affect the legislation appropriate for a polity: "[T]he result of 
this difference has been that the Heavenly City could not have laws of reli-
gion in common with the earthly city, and in defence of her religious laws 
she was bound to dissent from those who thought differently and to prove 
a burdensome nuisance to them" (878). 
Both Rawls and Augustine, then, face a similar problem: What holds a 
radically diverse people together politically? One possible way out of this 
difficulty would be to pick one available vision of the good life to serve as 
the "official" one. Political arrangements would promote that particular 
view, which citizens would be expected to adopt whether it was their own 
or not. Rawls clearly rejects this solution. One cannot appeal to any partic-
ular comprehensive moral doctrine as a basis for politics, he argues, 
because none is generally shared. Thus he writes, 
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The aim of justice as fairness, then, is practical: it presents itself as a 
conception of justice that may be shared by citizens as a basis of a rea-
soned, informed, and willing political agreement. It expresses their 
shared and public political reason. But to attain such a shared reason, 
the conception of justice should be, as far as possible, independent of 
the opposing and conflicting philosophical and religious doctrines 
that citizens affirm. In formulating such a conception, political liberal-
ism applies the principle of toleration to philosophy itself. (9-10) 
A theory of justice based on some particular comprehensive doctrine, in 
other words, would be rejected by many citizens, who would regard it as 
illegitimate. Thus no particular vision of the good life can serve as an ade-
quate basis for political unity. 
Augustine argues similarly that we cannot all agree on an understand-
ing of justice, because justice means rendering to each his due, and the 
earthly city does not render God his due. This is the point of Augustine's 
disagreement with Cicero over the definition of a commonwealth. Cicero, 
Augustine points out, had defined a commonwealth as "a multitude 'unit-
ed in association by a common sense of right and a community of interest'" 
(881), and had further explained that a "common sense of right" requires 
the presence of true justice. Augustine responds: "If, therefore, a common-
wealth is the 'weal of the people,' and if a people does not exist where 
there is no 'association by a common sense of right,' and there is no right 
where there is no justice, the irresistible conclusion is that where there is no 
justice there is no commonwealth" (882). And since our earthly cities do 
not give God his due, they-according to a definition which rests upon jus-
tice-are not commonwealths! In other words, if a commonwealth is 
thought to require an agreement about justice, none has ever existed or can 
ever exist. Because of the permanent "pluralism" of the two cities, the state 
does not (and cannot) be based upon a common understanding of justice.6 
Perhaps, though, Rawls and Augustine are doing different things in 
rejecting this possible solution to the problem of political unity. After all, 
Rawls rejects "comprehensive doctrines" as the source of unity, whereas 
Augustine rejects an agreement about "justice;" moreover, Rawls goes on 
to argue that it is precisely a "political" conception of justice about which 
we can agree. This difficulty is more apparent than real, though, caused by 
using different verbal labels to describe the same difficulty, as well as by a 
difference in perspective: Augustine writes from within his own compre-
hensive doctrine, whereas Rawls attempts to describe such doctrines from 
a vantage point external to them all. But this should not obscure the simi-
lar dynamic of both arguments. Rawls, for instance, describes "compre-
hensive doctrines" as moral doctrines that apply to the whole of life and 
order all values. As he puts it, 
A moral conception is general if it applies to a wide range of subjects, 
and in the limit to all subjects universally. It is comprehensive when 
it includes conceptions of what is of value in human life, and ideals of 
personal character, as well as ideals of friendship and of familial and 
associational relationships, and much else that is to inform our con-
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duct, and in the limit to our life as a whole. A conception is fully 
comprehensive if it covers all recognized values and virtues within 
one rather precisely articulated system.... Many religious and philo-
sophical doctrines aspire to be both general and comprehensive. (13) 
In light of this passage, consider Augustine's description of the proper 
order of the universe: 
The peace of the body, we conclude, is a tempering of the component 
parts in duly ordered proportion; the peace of the irrational soul is a 
duly ordered repose of the appetites; the peace of the rational soul is 
the duly ordered agreement of cognition and action. The peace of 
body and soul is the duly ordered life and health of a living creature; 
peace between mortal man and God is an ordered obedience, in faith, 
in subjection to an everlasting law; peace between men is an ordered 
agreement of mind with mind; the peace of a home is the ordered 
agreement among those who live together about giving and obeying 
orders; the peace of the Heavenly City is a perfectly ordered and per-
fectly harmonious fellowship in the enjoyment of God, and a mutual 
fellowship in God; the peace of the whole universe is the tranquillity 
of order-and order is the arrangement of things equal and unequal 
in a pattern which assigns to each its proper position. (870) 
This broad vision of the just order of the universe in terms of various kinds 
of peace is an excellent example of what Rawls means by a "comprehensive 
doctrine." It includes political values ("peace between men"), but extends 
beyond them to include" all recognized values and virtues within one rather 
precisely articulated system." Augustine concludes his description by not-
ing that order requires assigning everything its proper place, an echo of 
Aristotle's classical definition of justice. And at the top of this properly 
ordered universe serving as a model for all the lesser varieties of peace that 
together compose the "tranquillity of order," is fellowship with God in his 
heavenly city. In the Augustinian vision, justice--"that virtue which assigns 
to everyone his due" (882}--extends to the very fount of all existence. 
But if it is fair to call this passage a summary of an Augustinian" com-
prehensive doctrine," in Rawls's terms, then it should be clear that 
Augustine, no less than Rawls, rejects the possibility of such a doctrine's 
serving as the basis for political order. For, as we have seen, Augustine 
rejects Cicero's notion that justice could serve as the basis for a common-
wealth precisely on the grounds that the earthly city does not give God his 
due, does not, that is, fulfill the requirements of justice from a Christian 
perspective: "[W]hen a man does not serve God, what amount of justice 
are we to suppose to exist in his being?" (883). The earthly city cannot 
embrace Augustine's comprehensive Christian doctrine, because doing so 
would require understanding justice more broadly than it is prepared to 
do. Thus Augustine's rejection of "justice" as a possible basis for political 
unity does not differ fundamentally from Rawls's rejection of "comprehen-
sive doctrines." They use different language, because for Augustine "jus-
tice" ultimately involves the order of the universe as a whole, whereas 
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Rawls speaks in tenns of the much more restricted "political" conception 
of justice, a "publicly recognized point of view" that can be endorsed by all 
citizens (9). Nevertheless, Augustine, working from within his own com-
prehensive doctrine, also concludes that such a doctrine cannot serve as the 
basis for public order and stability, precisely because he does not think it 
can ever be shared by all the members of a political community. Thus he, 
like Rawls, rejects the possibility that one particular vision of the good life 
as a whole could provide a shared foundation for political unity.7 
But if citizens cannot agree on a comprehensive doctrine or the meaning 
of justice broadly understood, perhaps they can agree on something less. 
Rather than appeal to a comprehensive doctrine as the basis of political 
unity, Rawls argues, we should develop a "political" conception of justice. 
The crucial feature of a political conception is that it is "freestanding," that 
is, presented independently of any particular comprehensive doctrine 
(though for any given person, its legitimacy will depend on its compatibili-
ty with his own comprehensive doctrine). As Rawls puts it, "While we 
want a political conception to have a justification by reference to one or 
more comprehensive doctrines, it is neither presented as, nor as derived 
from, such a doctrine applied to the basic structure of society, as if this 
structure were simply another subject to which that doctrine applied" (12). 
A political conception of justice is also "expressed in terms of certain fun-
damental ideas seen as implicit in the public political culture of a democra-
tic society" (13); that is, its principles are drawn from the culture for which 
it is to serve as a conception of justice. Finally, the conception is, as Rawls 
puts it, IJ constructed," or arrived at through an appropriate procedure 
which draws upon the public culture to create a conception which relies 
upon no particular comprehensive doctrine. Since this conception is not 
derived from or dependent upon any particular comprehensive doctrine, 
all reasonable members of society can endorse it, because it does not con-
tradict their fundamental beliefs. Their various comprehensive doctrines 
thus converge on the political conception, forming what Rawls calls an 
"overlapping consensus," an agreement on a limited range of principles 
appropriate for arranging fundamental political matters. Thus, if the polit-
ical conception of justice can be correctly constructed, "citizens should be 
able to accept its principles and conceptions along with their reasonable 
comprehensive doctrine" (97). 
Augustine pursues a similar strategy. After rejecting the Ciceronian 
definition of a commonwealth, he offers his own, alternative definition, 
which does not rely on an agreement about justice. He writes, IJ A people is 
the association of a multitude of rational beings united by a common 
agreement on the objects of their love" (890). This definition replaces 
reliance upon justice, about which people cannot agree, with the realistic 
suggestion that, to observe the source of a people's political unity, one 
must look to its culture and see what loves its citizens share. Another way 
of saying this is that our earthly cities are not the City of God; and this, 
understood broadly, is to say that politics cannot encompass comprehen-
sive doctrines about the good life. Thus Augustine writes, "So also the 
earthly city, whose life is not based on faith, aims at an earthly peace, and it 
limits the harmonious agreement of citizens concerning the giving and 
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obeying of orders to the establishment of a kind of compromise between 
human wills about the things relevant to mortal life" (877). 
Where Rawls speaks of an "overlapping consensus," then, Augustine 
refers to a "compromise between human wills about the things relevant to 
mortal life." Rawls looks to the public political culture to construct a free-
standing, political conception of justice compatible with the various com-
prehensive doctrines present in society; Augustine to the "shared loves" 
that people have in common to establish a limited "harmonious agreement 
of citizens concerning the giving and obeying of orders." But the point is 
the same. Both seek a basis for political unity that does not depend on con-
troversial world-views, but rests instead on those things about which citi-
zens can agree. Thus, in Rawls's terms, citizens should not appeal to "the 
whole truth" (218-19,224-5,242-3)' should not insist upon universal agree-
ment across the whole range of moral issues; or, in Augustine's terms, citi-
zens should not seek to inaugurate the City of God here and now. Both 
thinkers, one might say, restrain the ambitions of politics. Politics cannot 
resolve all issues or achieve full justice. It deals with a limited range of 
concerns, rooted in those things which citizens are united in regarding as 
fundamentally necessary or desirable. 
II. Rawls the Moral Philosopher and Augustine the Realist: An Objection 
One might object, though, that what Rawls means by an "overlapping con-
sensus" and what Augustine has in mind by "shared loves" are not really 
the same at all. Rawls-the objection might run-seeks to present a con-
ception of justice which, though freestanding, is nevertheless a moral con-
ception; he is engaged in normative moral philosophy. Augustine, on the 
other hand, is doing nothing of the sort; in referring to "shared loves," he is 
offering a purely positive or descriptive account of political unity and sta-
bility-what constitutes a people is simply whatever loves they happen to 
have in common, and there is nothing more to be said about it. A slightly 
different way of stating the objection would be that Rawls explicitly claims 
to be constructing more than a mere modus vivendi, whereas Augustine 
really seeks only a modus vivendi, to be produced through a kind of plural-
ist bargaining, and any such modus vivendi will do. Rawls, as it were, aims 
higher than Augustine does.' 
There is some truth to this objection. Augustine is prepared to settle for 
less than Rawls is. In his view, any set of shared loves can serve as the 
basis for a polity: "I shall not make that a reason for asserting that a people 
is not really a people or that a state is not a commonwealth, so long as there 
remains an association of some kind or other between a multitude of ratio-
nal beings united by a common agreement on the objects of its love" (890). 
If the only things that people really love in common are, say, Gargle the 
Conqueror and the booty he provides, they presumably constitute" a peo-
ple" under Augustine's definition, even if only the crudest sort; their agree-
ment need not reach the level of shared constitutional principles envi-
sioned by Rawls's overlapping consensus.9 One of the points of distin-
guishing between the two cities, after all, is to make it clear that from the 
standpoint of eternity earthly politics is of no ultimate or sacred signifi-
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cance, that our salvation in no way rests upon whether our polity prefers 
Gargle or ordered liberty. Nevertheless, this objection simultaneously 
overstates the descriptive element of Augustine's account and understates 
it in Rawls's case. Exploring some reasons why this distinction ultimately 
fails will help flesh out the comparison made in section one. 
First and foremost, Rawls's own account is positivist and descriptive in 
essential ways. In saying that we look to ideas in the public political cul-
ture in order to construct our political conception of justice, Rawls con-
cedes that his conception is culture-specific, appropriate only for certain 
people, times, and places. lO This appeal to the public political culture is 
analogous to Augustine's suggestion that we seek the basis of a people's 
political unity in its shared loves. 
Nor should we exaggerate the particularism or relativism of 
Augustine's focus on shared loves. Though he may be prepared to accept 
(almost) any set of shared loves as a sufficient foundation for politics, for 
example, he is nevertheless willing to make evaluative judgements about 
better and worse regimes. After defining a people as an association "unit-
ed by a common agreement on the objects of their love," Augustine goes 
on to say that "to observe the character of a particular people we must 
examine the objects of its love.... And, obviously, the better the objects of 
this agreement, the better the people; the worse the objects of this love, the 
worse the people" (890). He makes precisely this sort of judgement when 
he rebukes his fellow Romans for their luxury, corruption, and vice (41-2), 
holding up to them the example of their nobler ancestors, men like 
Regulus, who, though far from saints, "served their country for the sake of 
honour, praise and glory .. .looked to find that glory in their country's safety 
above their own and ... suppressed greed for money and many other faults 
in favour of that one fault of theirs, the love of praise" (202). 
Furthermore, although Augustine directs us to look at the particular 
shared loves exhibited by a given people, which will differ from place to 
place, he also argues that at least some shared loves are universal and will be 
found among all peoples. This is clearest in the case of the most important 
shared love, peace. Augustine writes that "just as there is no man who does 
not wish for joy, so there is no man who does not wish for peace" (866). All 
people, wherever they may be and whatever city they may ultimately 
belong to, desire some of the same things, such as peace, order, and security. 
In light of this, it is possible-though I can do no more here than raise the 
possibility-that a developed Augustinian account of shared loves, com-
bined with the idea that politics is the site where the two cities meet (rather 
than where the City of God is to be built), might generate a set of basic rights 
or liberties similar to (though probably not identical with) those found in lib-
eral theories such as Rawls's. One basic right, for instance, seems clearly 
required by Augustinian principles: religious liberty. Because of the differ-
ence between the two cities, Augustine writes, "the Heavenly City could not 
have laws of religion in common with the earthly city" (878). Under no cir-
cumstances may the state require the Christian to violate his religion: 
[The Heavenly City] takes no account of any difference in customs, 
laws, and institutions, by which earthly peace is achieved and pre-
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served-not that she annuls or abolishes any of those, rather, she 
maintains them and follows them (for whatever divergences there 
are among the diverse nations, those institutions have one single 
aim-earthly peace), provided that no hindrance is presented thereby 
to the religion which teaches that the one supreme and true God is to 
be worshipped. (878) 
Our earthly cities end, as it were, where the civitas Dei begins, and there-
fore the two cities cannot have cornmon laws governing religion. And it 
seems plausible to think that Augustine's expansive understanding of 
peace, which I quoted earlier, could generate other rights or liberties as 
well. Would genuine peace not require at least some security in one's pos-
sessions? Would it not require some of the basic civil liberties of due 
process, such as protections against self-incrimination, double jeopardy, 
and the like, rights which constitute a fundamental distinction between 
free and totalitarian polities? Since it protects religion against political 
encroachment, an Augustinian politics is already a limited politics. 
Perhaps it would be limited in additional ways if one were to spell out the 
full implications of the idea of peace, understood in the broad Augustinian 
sense. At any rate, if this idea has promise, then an Augustinian politics 
seems to allow activity with as good a claim to the title of normative phi-
losophizing as Rawls's project has. l1 
Finally, Rawls attempts to distinguish a modus vivendi from an overlap-
ping consensus in this way: in the former the conception of justice is 
embraced only out of expediency, based on a calculation of interest in par-
ticular, contingent circumstances, whereas in the latter all the various com-
prehenSive doctrines embrace the conception on moral grounds, as justi-
fied on the basis of their own principles, and therefore will not withdraw 
their allegiance even if circumstances should change (145-9). But even if 
we accept this distinction, it seems clear that an Augustinian would 
endorse a limited politics of shared loves-a purely "political" conception 
of justice--as not only expedient, but also right.12 Augustine provides a 
real reason for being committed to a limited politics. This is because the 
sorting out of the two cities is an eschatolOgical affair. That politics cannot, 
and should not try to, instantiate the City of God here and now frees our 
earthly cities to focus upon those temporal concerns that its citizens share 
in cornmon. Indeed, a government of this limited kind is quite rightly val-
ued by the Augustinian, because it provides things, such as peace and 
order, which are genuine goods. As Augustine puts it, in a passage worth 
quoting at some length, 
While this Heavenly City, therefore, is on pilgrimage in this world, 
she calls out citizens from all nations and so collects a society of 
aliens, speaking all languages. She takes no account of any difference 
in customs, laws, and institutions, by which earthly peace is achieved 
and preserved-not that she annuls or abolishes any of those, rather, 
she maintains and follows them (for whatever divergences there are 
among the diverse nations, those institutions have one single aim-
earthly peace), provided that no hindrance is presented thereby to 
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the religion which teaches that the one supreme and true God is to be 
worshipped. Thus even the Heavenly City in her pilgrimage here on 
earth makes use of the earthly peace and defends and seeks the com-
promise between human wills in respect of the provisions relevant to 
the mortal nature of man, so far as may be permitted without detri-
ment to true religion and piety. (878) 
The members of the City of God defend and cherish the "compromise 
between human wills about the things relevant to mortal life" because it 
provides extremely valuable human goods. So the Augustinian bears an 
allegiance to the "political conception," the "shared loves," which is not 
just contingent or expedient, but which arises from the eschatological 
nature of the two cities themselves. 
One cannot, then, distinguish between Rawls and Augustine simply on 
the grounds that the former, engaged in moral philosophy, aims higher 
than the latter's merely descriptive account. A more nuanced reading rein-
forces the claim that there is a surprising structural similarity between 
Rawlsian political liberalism and an Augustinian politics of the two cities. 
At this point, though, one might raise a second objection, the mirror image 
of the first: that Augustine aims higher than Rawls does. Like the first, this 
objection also misses the mark, but considering it will point toward what 
finally does separate Augustine from Rawls, and why Augustine'S 
approach offers a surer foundation for liberalism than Rawls's. 
III. Rawlsian Fear and Ambitious Politics 
Perhaps I am right-perhaps Rawls does not really aim higher than 
Augustine. But does not Augustine in fact aim much higher than Rawls? 
To be sure, Augustine may be willing to settle for whatever shared loves 
happen to be present in a community, for a mere modus vivendi. But 
wouldn't he really like something much more than that? Unlike Rawls, 
after all, Augustine reasons on the basis of a particular comprehensive 
moral doctrine, one with definite beliefs about morality and the good life. 
And just because all earthly cities are equidistant from eternity hardly 
means that Augustine would not prefer one in which some substantive 
vision of the good life were shared. As we have seen, his contrasting 
judgements about the ancient Romans and his own contemporaries indi-
cate his willingness to evaluate the goodness of different polities. Nor does 
Augustine'S famous description, in Book V of The City of God, of ideal 
rulers, who "rule with justice ... put their power at the service of God's 
majesty, to extend his worship far and wide ... fear God, love him and wor-
ship him ... [and] take vengeance on wrong because of the necessity to direct 
and protect the state" (220), sound like that of a man whose ideal common-
wealth is held together by a minimal modus vivendi. 
But this does not quite capture the difference between Augustine and 
Rawls, either. For Rawls too would like something more than we might at 
first suspect. We can see this by considering a concept that Rawls develops 
at great length: the idea of public reason. Public reason defines the bounds 
of acceptable public discourse and debate, and it includes all those forms of 
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argument and inquiry whose compatibility with the political conception of 
justice is evident to the citizenry as a whole. It is thus intended to purify or 
cleanse public political debate of certain dangerous ideas, those principles 
and values that we could not reasonably expect our fellow citizens to 
endorse. Public reason's guidelines for inquiry are generated in the same 
way as the political conception itself, without relying on a particular com-
prehensive doctrine, and they direct citizens to offer in public debate only 
arguments which do not rely on their individual comprehensive doctrines 
(225). If they are to accord with the ideal of public reason, then, public 
arguments should be based on reasons other citizens can accept and regard 
as justified. Like the political conception of justice, public reason is 
designed to preserve stability by excluding from public debate arguments 
that are inevitably divisive and that would challenge the overlapping con-
sensus itself.13 
Augustine elaborates no such idea. This is not to say that he could make 
no sense of it; on the contrary, he opens Book XIX of The City of God by say-
ing that he will explain the great difference between the two cities "not 
merely by appealing to divine authority but also by employing such pow-
ers of reason as we can apply for the benefit of unbelievers" (843). And, of 
course, the claim that earthly politics is about "shared loves" implies that it 
will be conducted largely in terms somehow accessible to all citizens. 
Nevertheless, Augustine does not take the time to develop this concept in 
anything like the detail that Rawls does, and one might well suspect that 
Augustinian political debate is likely to be pretty wide open-if politics is 
about shared loves, people will have to argue about exactly what those 
loves actually are. 
Rawls's inclusion of an entire chapter explaining the concept of public 
reason is, or at least ought to be, quite surprising, for two reasons. First, it 
is not clear that public reason is consistent with the rest of Rawls's argu-
ment. Political liberalism, in his view, rests upon an overlapping consen-
sus on certain core political principles. But unrestricted debate-in which 
we examine the cornmon ground between various competing comprehen-
sive doctrines, explore the "fit" between our own larger view and different 
possible statements of shared public values, and inquire whether we and 
others indeed understand the linguistic labels given to putatively cornmon 
values to mean similar thingS-iS the only way in which we can ever dis-
cover whether an overlapping consensus actually exists or not, or whether 
a previously achieved consensus continues to hold. The ability to guide 
our public discussions according to the ideals of public reason, by offering 
only arguments we could reasonably expect all citizens to endorse, presup-
poses that we already know what people believe and what the possible 
range of reasonable agreement might be. But this knowledge can only 
arise from public discussion; it cannot precede it.14 
A second conundrum in Rawls's account of public reason arises from 
his chief illustration of how it might work: the Supreme Court, which 
Rawls refers to as the "exemplar of public reason" (231). In a constitutional 
democracy, Rawls suggests, the constitution fixes certain core principles, 
the subject of the overlapping consensus, which provide a framework and 
guide for political activity (232)Y The Supreme Court decides particular 
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controversies only in light of these agreed-upon public principles: "public 
reason is the sole reason the court exercises" (235). In doing so, the Court 
models the exercise of public reason for the citizenry at large (it "educates 
citizens to the use of public reason and its value of political justice" [239-
40)). Indeed, Rawls even says that citizens should use the Court's example 
as a way of testing whether they, in their own political activity, are adher-
ing to the limits of public reason: "To check whether we are following pub-
lic reason we might ask: how would our argument strike us presented in 
the form of a supreme court opinion? Reasonable? Outrageous?" (254) 
This is surprising because the Court itself has generally taken a quite 
different view of the matter. Even a casual examination of the Court's First 
Amendment jurisprudence reveals an extraordinarily fierce commitment 
to unfettered public debate, particularly with regard to political speech, the 
kind of discourse to which Rawlsian public reason is supposed to apply. 
In its unanimous decision in the famous libel case New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, for example, the Court declared that the "profound national com-
mitment" underlying the First Amendment is "the principle that debate on 
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" (376 U.s. 254, 
270). Nor is the Court here only reluctantly conceding that the First 
Amendment protects speech that, ideally, citizens would refrain from mak-
ing, as though we would all be better off if citizens voluntarily limited their 
discussions according to an ideal of public reason. On the contrary, the 
Court suggests-in a manner entirely typical of its jurisprudence in this 
area-that such restraint would deprive the public of that free and open 
clash of contesting ideas (even false ones!) that informed deliberation upon 
public affairs requires. Thus it approvingly quotes Cantwell v. Connecticut, 
an early case involving the free exercise of religion: 
In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, sharp 
differences arise. In both fields, the tenets of one man may seem the 
rankest error to his neighbor. To persuade others to his own point of 
view, the pleader, as we know, at times, resorts to exaggeration, to 
vilification of men who have been, or are, prominent in church or 
state, and even to false statement. But the people of this nation have 
ordained in the light of history, that, in spite of the probability of 
excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to 
enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of a 
democracy. (310 U.S. 296, 310, cited at 376 U.S. 254, 271)16 
On this view, citizens' attempt to pursue an ideal of public reason and 
refrain from stating their views on important matters would actually do 
the polity a disservice by diminishing the overall quality of their public 
debate. Thus Rawls's "exemplar of public reason" does not seem to share 
his view that it would be desirable for all citizens to approach public dis-
course as if they sat on the Supreme Court. 
Rawls's account of public reason, then, is puzzling, both because it has 
at best an uneasy relation with his larger argument, and also because it 
appears to diverge significantly from the chief illustration he offers of how 
it might work. Noticing this, I should emphasize, in no way depends upon 
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our being able to settle such complex and disputed questions as precisely 
how restrictive public reason is, what range of views it is intended to 
exclude, or whether it is systematically unfair to any particular group of 
citizens, such as religious believers.I7 Nor does it depend, for the same rea-
son, upon whether or not Rawls's more recent elaborations and modifica-
tions of public reason have in fact made the concept less restrictive and 
more inclusive than its initial presentation was.IS Clearly public reason in 
all its versions is supposed to exclude at least some views, since it would 
otherwise be nonsense, and I leave it to others to dispute the scope and 
value of those exclusions. My purpose here is simply to explore what pub-
lic reason can suggest to us about the difference between a Rawlsian and 
an Augustinian liberalism, which we have seen to be in many other 
respects strikingly similar. That purpose is sufficiently served by the 
observation that public reason, regardless of its precise boundaries, is a 
strange and surprising innovation on Rawls's part: unexpected for its pre-
carious relation to the rest of his theory, puzzling for its divergence from 
the example Rawls chooses as his model for its operation. In light of this 
puzzle, what should we make of Rawls's decision to devote an entire chap-
ter to the issue of public reason? What leads him to develop such a con-
cept? The answer, I want to suggest, is a kind of fear. A certain anxiety 
pervades Rawls's argument: he is unnerved by the prospect of "uninhibit-
ed, robust, and wide-open" debate. His argument about public reason is 
distinguished by a kind of nervousness, manifested in public reason's 
desire to exclude. This fear gives rise to the attempt to fix a conception of 
justice, at least in broad outline, in advance, to draw limits around accept-
able arguments and modes of debate, and to ensure that discussion pro-
ceeds along the proper channels. 
Why this fear, this deep anxiety-an anxiety which Augustine, who 
develops no concept of public reason, evidently does not share to the same 
degree? In a sense, no doubt, this is a silly question: as we have already 
seen, the desire for stability is the central motivation of Rawls's project. 
Political liberalism is generated by the need to achieve peace out of a situa-
tion of pluralism and potential conflict. Perhaps, though, there is a deeper 
reason for this anxiety. For Rawls too wants more from politics than one 
might initially expect-indeed, he has fairly high hopes for it. The idealized 
restraints of public reason-restraints which the Supreme Court has consis-
tently thought would decrease the vitality of public debate and weaken the 
protection of liberty-are the most important, but not the only evidence of 
this. Several other references in his book suggest that Rawls's liberal order 
aspires to certain features of classical republicanism. He speaks, for exam-
ple, of the political conception as "educator," a phrase which suggests that 
the political conception forms a real bond among citizens in a way reminis-
cent of classical republicanism: "Thus, the account of justice as fairness con-
nects the desire to realize a political ideal of citizenship with citizens' two 
moral powers and their normal capacities, as these are educated to that 
ideal by the public culture and its historical traditions of interpretation. 
This illustrates the wide role of a political conception as educator" (85-6). 
Later, in discussing the ways in which political society is itself a genuine 
good, valued for more than instrumental reasons, Rawls explicitly (though 
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briefly) discusses classical republicanism, which he calls "the view that if 
the citizens of a democratic society are to preserve their basic rights and lib-
erties, including the civil liberties which secure the freedoms of private life, 
they must also have to a sufficient degree the 'political virtues' ... and be will-
ing to take part in public life" (205). He concludes, "With classical republi-
canism so understood, justice as fairness as a form of political liberalism has 
no fundamental opposition" (205). Rawls even indicates, in a highly sug-
gestive aside, that the ideal of public reason is similar to Rousseau's concept 
of the general will: "[P]ublic reason with its duty of civility gives a view 
about voting on fundamental questions in some ways reminiscent of 
Rousseau's Social Contract. He saw voting as ideally expressing our opinion 
as to which of the alternatives best advances the common good" (220). 
Rawls strikingly reaffirms these aspirations in his recent elaboration of pub-
lic reason, where he emphasizes that it expresses the political relationship 
among citizens as one of "civic friendship."19 
These verbal cues may seem slender evidence upon which to build a 
case. And indeed they would be, were the purpose to prove that Rawls 
endorses all the features of Rousseau's ideal republic, with its ambitious 
censors and sumptuary codes, or that he is a latter-day Harrington draw-
ing up the blueprint for a future Oceana. But that, of course, is not the 
point. Especially in a writer as notoriously slippery and hard to pin down 
as Rawls, attending to subtler linguistic cues can be informative; and the 
value of these particular cues is that they throw light upon a partly con-
cealed longing that helps explain the otherwise puzzling phenomenon of 
public reason. For they reveal to us Rawls's apparent hope that a well-
ordered society governed by an overlapping consensus on a political con-
ception of justice would in fact tum out to be a source of fulfillment for its 
citizens, who could become not only citizens, but friends. This hope 
accounts for the muted sense of urgency with which he responds to the 
communitarian critics of his earlier work, seeking to persuade them that he 
offers more than a mere modus vivendi. In other words, the fear that moti-
vates the development of public reason is not simply a fear that political 
liberalism won't work, but that it won't work well, that it will fail to pro-
vide any deeper bonds that would hold us together and commit us to each 
other. It is this anxiety that creates the need to fix a conception of justice in 
advance and to provide guidelines restricting debate and excluding poten-
tially destabilizing ideas. 
But this, again, should be surprising. For this effort stands in stark con-
trast to the overall motive of the Rawlsian project as a whole. The original 
aim of political liberalism was to be as inclusive as possible, to construct a 
public agreement about justice shallow enough that it would not need to 
exclude any reasonable people. Political liberalism is thus appropriately 
characterized as a politics of limited ambitions, an unpretentious politics. 
Yet the ideal of public reason indicates some lingering dissatisfaction with 
that goal. It represents a longing for a loftier politics, one in which citizens 
are joined in agreement on a vision of justice and adlieve some measure of 
genuine fulfillment from the pursuit thereof. These two different move-
ments in Rawls's thought-first towards limiting our understanding of 
what must hold us together, and then towards raising the standard once 
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again-are perhaps not flatly contradictory, but at the least they stand in 
powerful tension with one another. 
The difference between Augustine and Rawls, then, is not simply that 
Augustine wants more from politics than Rawls does. Rawls too has high 
hopes. The difference is that Rawls, unlike Augustine, introduces into his 
theory a mechanism designed to ensure that those high hopes are not 
doomed by the pluralism within society. Augustine, on the other hand, 
need develop no concept of public reason because he is prepared to accept 
a limited politics of low ambitions. Not that all polities are simply equal; as 
we have seen, Augustine can make comparative judgements about better 
and worse regimes, and he surely has preferences of his own. But viewed 
in the light of the Heavenly City, all of our earthly cities are wanting, and 
this perspective frees him-and us-from asking too much of politics. 
Thus, whereas Rawls asks whether it is "possible for citizens of faith to be 
wholehearted members of a democratic society,"20 Augustine, aware that 
believers will never be "wholehearted" members of any earthly society, 
need not impose upon citizens the moral obligations of public reason. In 
Book III of The City of God, in a line of great poignancy and insight, 
Augustine says of Sallust and other Roman historians that, in writing 
about Rome, "in many places they have been constrained to praise in terms 
of the highest eulogy, since they have not another City which is a truer one 
than theirs" (112). It may well be that, without another, truer City, one 
inevitably praises the cities of earthly politics too highly and asks too much 
of them. One may seek to lower the aims of politics to a minimal level; but 
if this city is all one has, how long can one remain satisfied with that?21 
By suggesting in this way that Augustine's perspective may ultimately 
provide a superior foundation for political liberalism, I do not mean to 
diminish Rawls's achievement. His book is without question an extremely 
insightful presentation of liberalism's central purposes and method. Yet 
perhaps its most valuable contribution is to encourage us to ask once again 
whether a flourishing liberal politics in our cities may not ultimately 
require awareness of another city. Even devoted liberals may find them-
selves losing confidence in their own limited aims-as Rawls does in 
developing the idea of public reason-if they feel themselves responsible 
for achieving, in the only city they know, an ever "more perfect justice," as 
Rawls misstates the aim of the American Constitution's Preamble (41).22 To 
value politics appropriately for the very real goods it provides, while ask-
ing of it no more than it can actually offer-which is, after all, the balance 
liberalism seeks to strike-is a task which may well require that we have 
another, truer City. 
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5. Augustine was equally familiar, of course, with theological pluralism: 
"The Devil...stirred up heretics to oppose Christian doctrine-though they 
bore the Christian name-as if they could be retained indiscriminately in the 
City of God without reproof, just as the city of confusion retained indifferently 
the philosophers who held diverse and contradictory opinions" (833). 
6. In a sense this oversimplifies Augustine's claim by conflating his state-
ment of Cicero's position ("where there is no justice, there is no common-
wealth") with a slightly altered version of it ("where there is no agreement 
about justice, there is no commonwealth"), since there could presumably be 
justice without agreement and agreement without justice. Making this distinc-
tion would not affect the argument, however, since Augustine's position in 
effect denies the possibility of either of these alternatives. There cannot be jus-
tice without agreement, because, as explained in the text, justice would require 
rendering God his due, which the earthly city (always "intermixed and inter-
woven" with the heavenly in this life) by definition does not do. Similarly, 
there cannot be agreement without justice, because, again by definition, the 
two cities, differing as they do about the purpose of human life and the source 
of happiness, can never agree about what justice is. More precisely, there can 
(as I shall argue) be agreement about a variety of things, but there cannot be 
agreement about justice (understood in the broad, Augustinian sense of a com-
prehensive doctrine-see the discussion which follows in the text), which is the 
possible solution to the stability problem under discussion here, and which 
both Rawls and Augustine reject. 
7. Obviously, one way of solving the problem of pluralism would be sim-
ple coercion (a way, I suppose, of trying to achieve either "agreement without 
justice" or "justice without agreement," depending on your perspective; see 
previous note). Rawls clearly rules this out as unacceptable. With: Augustine 
the case is more complicated: during the Donatist controversy, to take the obvi-
ous example, he eventually came to support, after initially opposing, the coer-
cion of heretics. This matter is too complex for me to sort out here; for the pur-
poses of my argument, let me merely say that in my view the best interpreta-
tion of Augustine's principles as they are expressed in The City of God would 
not permit religious coercion. For one sympathetic attempt to explain 
Augustine's conflicting positions, an attempt that supports the argument 
offered here, see Markus, Saeculum, ch. 6. 
8. I am indebted to Paul Weithman for encouraging me to consider this 
objection. 
9. Recall Augustine'S memorable comparison of kingdoms to robber 
bands: "Remove justice, and what are kingdoms but gangs of criminals on a 
large scale? What are criminal gangs but petty kingdoms? A gang is a group of 
men under the command of a leader, bound by a compact of association, in 
which the plunder is divided according to an agreed convention" (139). This 
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does not mean, of course, that the objects which a people loves in common can-
not extend higher, even to the level of abstract prinCiples. Indeed, I believe 
Augustine's discussion suggests that they generally do. Even the comparison to 
robber gangs just quoted makes clear Augustine's view that any sort of human 
association requires certain kinds of agreements and rules, especially a shared 
desire to maintain peace among the associates (itself a rough principle), in order 
to function. I elaborate on these points in the following discussion. It is also 
worth noting that neither how people reach agreement nor what they value about 
that agreement seems particularly important in either the Rawlsian or the 
Augustinian account. Rawls explicitly says that people will support an overlap-
ping consensus for different reasons, grounded in their various comprehensive 
doctrines; and Augustine does not imagine that Christians and non-Christians, 
though they all value the shared good of civic peace, do so for the same reasons. 
10. In calling Rawls's conception culture-specific, I do not mean that it 
could never apply anywhere other than, say, contemporary Western democra-
cies. Nevertheless, it is applicable only in places where it can successfully 
appeal to the public political culture for support. It is crucial to Rawls's 
approach that the political conception of justice be thus drawn from the public 
political culture, because only in this way can it remain "freestanding" and win 
the allegiance of people with diverse views; the attempt to get "behind" the 
public political culture and make a direct argument for political liberalism itself 
would need to invoke a comprehensive doctrine and could therefore not serve 
as the basis for political unity. Thus a Rawlsian political conception of justice, 
like Augustine's shared loves, is always derived from the common culture of a 
particular people, and in that sense it is clearly culture-specific. 
11. Arguably, peace is also the cornerstone of Rawls's "overlapping con-
sensus." Because the need for stability motivates his project, one might say 
that this desire for peace ultimately generates the Rawlsian set of basic rights 
and liberties. 
12. I doubt that we should accept the distinction. Cf. Jean Hampton, 
"Should Political Philosophy Be Done without Metaphysics?", Ethics 99:4 (July 
1989), pp. 791-814; see esp. pp. 802-7. To her critique I would add the sugges-
tion that the attempt to distinguish between a modus vivendi and an overlapping 
consensus actually obscures the strengths of Rawls's own theory by oversimpli-
fying the relationship between endorsing a certain consensus as "expedient" 
and endorsing it as "right." One of liberalism's great insights-reaching back to 
the struggles over religious toleration that Rawls cites as a model for his own 
theory-nas been the understanding that, given certain realities of human exis-
tence (such as pluralism), principles endorsed primarily for pragmatic reasons 
can tum out (precisely because, as Rawls sees, they avoid trying to settle the 
matter of justice in the comprehensive sense) to produce the most just results-
thus demonstrating that they were not only pragmatic but right. In other 
words, the same conditions which make a modus vivendi necessary may also 
make it just. The attempt to show that his conception represents more than a 
"mere" modus vivendi is therefore both confusing and unnecessary. Rawls's dis-
satisfaction with a modus vivendi and desire to elevate it to the level of an over-
lapping consensus is relevant to the broader questions I raise in section three. 
13. Rawls does state explicitly that public reason is a moral and not a legal 
ideal (213, 253); that is, we are not to be legally forced to restrict our public dis-
course via public reason, though we should generally wish to do so of our own 
accord. I snould also note that, strictly speaking, the constraints of public rea-
son apply only to debates over "constitutional essentials" (214). Still, Rawls 
does suggest that ideally public reason would apply to all public arguments if 
possible ("it is usually highly desirable to settle political questions by invoking 
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the values of public reason" [215}). And discerning exactly what issues do or 
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14. For a discussion of whether or to what extent public reason rigidly fixes 
a conception of justice in advance, see the debate between Jeremy Waldron, 
"Religious Contributions in Public Deliberation," 30 San Diego Law Review 817 
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the phrases of the Constitution were so clear that we all knew more or less 
what they require. In reality, though, those phrases are abstract and need 
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agree on a consensus as to their meaning (or possible range of meaning) or are 
simply adopting the same linguistic labels to refer to very different things. 
16. The Court also cites with approval Mill's On Liberty, to similar effect: 
" ... To argue sophistically, to suppress facts or arguments, to misstate the ele-
ments of the case, or misrepresent the opposite opinion ... all this, even to the 
most aggravated degree, is so continually done in perfect good faith, by per-
sons who are not considered, and in many other respects may not deserve to 
be considered, ignorant or incompetent, that it is rarely possible, on adequate 
grounds, conscientiously to stamp the misrepresentation as morally culpable; 
and still less could law presume to interfere with this kind of controversial mis-
conduct" (cited at 376 U.S. 254, 272, n. 13). 
17. For criticisms that public reason unfairly excludes religious believers 
from public debate, see Philip L. Quinn, "Political Liberalisms and Their 
Exclusions of the Religious" (pp. 138-61), and Nicholas Wolterstorff, "Why We 
Should Reject What Liberalism Tells Us about Speaking and Acting in Public 
for Religious Reasons" (pp. 162-81), both in Paul J. Weithman (ed.), Religion and 
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The literature on just how exclusive public reason is (and whether this is objec-
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18. Rawls's first attempt at such elaboration can be found in the 
"Introduction to the Paperback Edition" of Political Liberalism (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. xxxvii-lxii, and his most recent, fullest 
statement is in "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited," in Rawls, The Law of 
Peoples, with "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited" (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1999), pp. 129-80. The most important revision of Rawls's views in these 
writings is his move from the "inclusive" to the "wide" view of public reason. In 
his original account, in Political Liberalism, Rawls endorsed what he called the 
"inclusive" view of public reason, according to which citizens are allowed, "in 
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certain situations, to present what they regard as the basis of political values 
rooted in their comprehensive doctrine, provided they do this in ways that 
strengthen the ideal of public reason itself" (247). Under the "wide" view, by 
contrast, "reasonable comprehensive doctrines, religious or nonreligious, may be 
introduced in public political discussion at any time, provided that in due course 
proper political reasons-and not reasons given solely by comprehensive doc-
trines-are presented that are sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive 
doctrines introduced are said to support" ("PR Revisited," p. 152; Rawls refers to 
the latter condition as "the proviso"). Though the wide view is in one sense 
more permissive, because it allows comprehensive doctrines to be introduced 
into public debate more frequently, note that it is also in an important respect 
more restrictive than the inclusive view: in Rawls's initial presentation, those who 
wish to present their comprehensive doctrines are justified, "in certain situa-
tions," if their doing so strengthens the ideal of public reason; now, however, 
under the more recent "wide" view, they face the new burden of having to pro-
vide additional public reasons for their views, which they previously did not 
have to provide! This ironic result is evident from Rawls's treatment of his two 
test cases, the abolitionists and the civil rights movement, both of whose appeals 
to comprehensive (Christian) doctrines he wishes to regard as justified. In his 
initial presentation, in Political Liberalism, Rawls was able to write, "On this 
account the abolitionists and the leaders of the civil rights movement did not ~o 
against the ideal of public reason; or rather, they did not provided they thought, 
or on reflection would have thought (as they certainly could have thought), that 
the comprehensive reasons they appealed to were required to give sufficient 
strength to the political conception to be subsequently realized" (251). For practi-
cal purposes, on this view, it appears to suffice if we can supply hypothetical 
public reasons to which the people in question might have appealed, even if they 
did not. The new, wide view, however, with its "proviso," clearly requires that 
the citizens in question actually supply additional public reasons for their views 
themselves, reasons they did not have to supply under Rawls's earlier view. As 
a result, there must surely have been at least some abolitionists and civil rights 
supporters who were justified under the old, "inclusive" view, but are not any 
longer under the new, "wide" one. Thus it is not suprising that Rawls now con-
cedes rather lamely in a footnote, "I do not know whether the Abolitionists and 
King thought of themselves as fulfilling the purpose of the proviso" ("PR 
Revisited," p. 154, £n. 54). And he continues with this shockingly patronizing 
comment: "But whether they did or not, they could have. And had they known 
and accepted the idea of public reason, they would have" (idem.). Had Rawls 
only developed the idea of public reason earlier, he might have saved King and 
his comrades from the ignominy of possibly violating the moral duties of public 
reason! Careful comparison of very slight changes in wording from "Preface," p. 
Iii, £n. 27, to "PR Revisited," p. 154, £n. 54, in connection with the accompanying 
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